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Summary  findings
Mexico's growth rate began to plummet at roughly the  appears to have weakened significantly in the past
same time that its public investment expenditures  decade.
declined. That decline also appears to coincide with a  A third reason for questioning a stable relationship is
slowdown in the growth of infrastructure capital in the  that the impact of increased public investment is likely to
electricity, transport,  and communications sectors.  depend on how it is financed. The cross-country
Because of these parallel developments, many economists  regressions reported  here indicate that a general increase
have attributed  at least part of the blame for the decline  in the public capital stock has a positive impact on
in Mexico's growth after 1981 to the decline of public  growth only if financed through savings generated
infrastructure investment. The empirical results  through lower public consumption expenditures, but not
presented in this report provide only limited support for  if financed through higher public debt, which implies
this argument. They also suggest, in turn, that increases  higher current  and future taxation levels. The scope for
in public investment would not automatically translate  reducing public consumption expenditures in Mexico is
into faster output and productivity growth.  very limited, however, since they are already at rock
One reason not to take for granted a positive  bottom levels. Therefore,  the only way to assure that the
relationship between more public investment and faster  public investment program makes a significant
growth is public investment's crowding out effect on  contribution to growth is by improving its "quality"
private investment. Although the time-series regression  through  careful attention  to its rate of return and
results for Mexico all point toward a crowding out  complementarity with private capital.
coefficient of less than unity, the existence of a  In iMlexico  the most important  reforms to make public
significant crowding out effect limits the growth impact  investment more productive came from policymakers'
of public investment by reducing its net effect on capital  recognition of the need to distinguish more clearly
accumulation.  between the roles of the public and private sectors. This
The time-series results also suggest that the economy's  led to the privatization of most public enterprises and a
total factor productivity growth responds positively to  reorientation  of public investment to a more narrowly
increases in the ratio of public to private investment. In  focused set of activities. In addition, the government
light of that result, increases in public investment should  took important  steps to strengthen the institutional
have a positive net impact on economic growth, despite  framework within which the public investment program
significant crowding out effects. Chow breakpoint tests  is determined.
indicate, however, that the positive productivity effect
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Mexico's growth rate began to plummet roughly at the same time that its
public investment level declined.  That decline also coincided with a slowdown in the
growth of infrastructure capital in the electric, transport and communications sectors;
Feltenstein and Ha (1995).  In view of these parallel developments, many economists
have attributed at least part of the blame for Mexico's  growth decline on the lack of
adequate public investment.
The notion that public investment and economic growth are positively
related is often taken for granted. It underlies, for example, the Mexican Government's
official economic strategy for promoting growth in 1997 and 1998.1 There are several
reasons, however, for suspecting that such a relationship may not be stable or may only
hold in certain circumstances.  Identifying those circumstances is important from a policy
viewpoint in order to ensure that public spending has the expected impact and does not
lead to resource misallocation.  The next section lists the main reasons why public
investment can either have a positive or a negative impact on overall economic growth.
This is followed by an empirical analysis of the impact of public investment in Mexico,
using both a time-series and cross-country approach.
A.  Supply-Side Links Between Public Investment and Growth
If public and private capital are perfect substitutes, an increase in public
investment would have the same effect on growth as an increase in private investment.
That is, both contribute to the accumulation of physical capital, which increases the
capacity to sustain a higher level of output. An extra Peso spent on public investment,
however, may not necessarily lead to an additional Peso in physical capital because
public investment may displace or crowd out private investment.  Such crowding out
could happen in one of two ways: financially, if the public sector finances the increase in
public investment with higher taxes or by borrowing in the domestic capital market, and
physically, to the extent that the public sector investment exhausts market opportunities
that could have been filled by the private sector. The first occurs when capital is not
perfectly mobile internationally.  In that case, public borrowing in the domestic capital
market drives up domestic interest rates, which reduces private investment demand.  The
amount of physical crowding out, on the other hand, depends on whether the public
investment involves "public" or private goods and, thus, substitutes for or is
lEconomic  Policy Guidelines  (Criterios  Generales  de Politica  Econ6mica)  for 1997  (pg. 3) and 1998  (pg.
17).  The latter  states,  for example,  that the strategy  for promoting  economic  growth  rests on two
fundamental  pillars:  the maintenance  of favorable  conditions  to support  higher  private  investment
levels  and continued  impulses  to public  investment.2
complementary to private investment.  The international experience, as surveyed in a
multi-country study by Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), suggests that it
is far more common for public investment to crowd out than to crowd in private
investment. 2
Another way that public investment affects output growth is by
influencing the rate of productivity growth, independent of its effect on factor
accumulation.  If public infrastructure capital is complementary to private capital, an
increase in public investment would not only attract more private capital, thereby
boosting factor accumulation, but it would also render private capital more productive.
This effect is absent when public investment substitutes for private investment.  In fact, it
will even reduce overall productivity if public expenditures are made with less regard for
appropriate procurement procedures than private investment.  That is, a Peso of public
investment will have bought fewer goods or machines than the same Peso invested by the
private sector, so that the level of actual capital accumulation would be lower than the
measured capital accumulation 3 -- which in a growth accounting framework becomes
reflected in lower productivity.
The same is true if  public investment expenditures are made with less
concern for efficiency and profitability than private investments.  When measured by the
amount spent, the public capital stock would overstate its true value, which is measured
more appropriately by the discounted stream of returns.  If, for example, public
investments are directed to sectors or regions based mainly on an expected political pay-
off, their financial returns will obviously be lower than those of private investments
primarily undertaken in response to profit incentives. Furthermore, to the extent that this
public capital is not properly operated and maintained, the rates of return diminish even
further.
Finally, the impact of public investment on growth may also depend on
how that investment is financed.  To the extent that an increment in public investment is
financed through higher taxes or through increased public debt -- which spreads out the
tax burden over time -- the net return of that investment is reduced by the distortionary
impact that those taxes may have on the economy.  That distortionary impact on growth
also manifests itself through the two channels discussed previously: (i) on reduced factor
accumulation, which occurs when higher taxes lead to a net reduction in total investment,
and, (ii) on lower productivity, which occurs when investors shift to less socially
2 Among  their main findings  and conclusions,  the authors  state,  "The conventional  wisdom  that public
investnent is good for  private  investrnent  is contradicted  by the evidence  in half of the case studies,
where  public  investment  has a negative  and statistically  significant  effect  on private  investment. The
negative  association  in some cases is explained  by the likelihood  that public  investment  is replacing
rather  than complementing  private  investment.  Concentration  of public  investment  on infrastructure
and on privatization  of other  state enterprises  would  ensure  a complementary  relationship  between  the
public  and private  sectors." (pg. 1).
3 Pritchett  (1996),  for example,  provides  calculations  to show that in a typical  developing  country,  less than
50 cents  of capital is created  for each  public  dollar invested.3
profitable  economic  activities  in order  to evade government  taxes. Estimates  of the
marginal  costs associated  with raising  revenues  from the least distortionary  tax
instrument  in developed  countries  range from 32%-47%  in the United States  to 120% in
Sweden.  In developing  countries,  the marginal  cost of public funds  is likely  to be even
higher. 4 Based  on these findings,  it is probably  safe to assume  that for Mexico  there is a
deadweight  loss of at least half a Peso imposed  on the economy  for each Peso raised in
taxes.
One direct indication  of high deadweight  losses in Mexico's tax system  is
given by the low  productivity  of its value-added  tax (VAT). The VAT productivity  ratio
-- defined  as the ratio of actual  VAT revenues  over GDP divided  by the average  VAT
rate -- is widely  regarded  as an important  indicator  of the efficiency  of revenue
generation. As shown  in Loayza  and Palacios  (1997,  Chart 16), Mexico  has one of the
lowest (trade-adjusted)  VAT productivity  ratios in the region as well as the OECD. This
ratio averaged  0.23  in Mexico  during 1992-94  (and declined  to 0.15 during  the 1995
crisis),  compared  to an unweighted  average  ratio of 0.28 for Latin  America  and the
Caribbean. This figure is substantially  below  the ratios observed,  for example,  in
Argentina  (3  1%),  Brazil (47%),  Chile (0.39)  and Colombia  (0.30),  or in developed
countries,  where  they lie between  0.30 and 0.70.
B. The Evolution  of Public  Investment  in Mexico
Table 1 shows  how  public and private  investment  have evolved  in Mexico
since 1960. Public investment  started  out as a modest share  of GDP in 1960, increased
sharply in the 1970s,  and then declined  again in the 1980s  and 1990s. This evolution
reflects  the evolution  of economic  strategies  pursued in Mexico  over this period: during
the import  substitution  industrialization  (ISI)  strategy  adopted  in the 1960s, public
investment  focused  on the development  of key "strategic"  industries,  considered
complementary  to the overall  industrialization  effort;  e.g., the electricity  sector,  railroads
and irrigation  systems. The rapid expansion  of public  investment  in the 1970s,  in turn,
coincides  with the indiscriminate  proliferation  and expansion  of parastatals  that
accompanied  the public  sector-driven  growth strategy  implemented  in the 1970s. This
period is characterized  by the expansion  of various  "white elephants",  such as the public
steel enterprise. The main boom  in public investment  spending,  however,  took place
toward  the end of the decade  and focused  on the petroleum  sector, following  the
discovery  of major oil deposits.
After  peaking  at 12 percent  of GDP in 1981,  Mexico's public  investmnent
experienced  a progressive  decline  that continued  until the mid-  1990s. At first, this
decline  was driven  by the exigencies  of fiscal retrenchment  and the drying  up of foreign
borrowing  opportunities  in the aftermath  of the 1982  crisis. Starting  in the mid-  1  980s,
4These  estimates are from Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1995), pg. 18, which also discusses
various key factors that determine the marginal welfare cost of taxation.4
however, the continued decline of public investment followed naturally from the
government's new economic strategy, which was oriented toward creating a more private
sector-based, market-friendly economy.
Table 1: Mexico -- Gross Fixed Investment
(constant  prices,  as % of GDP)
Years  Total  Private  Public
1960-1964  16.8  12.6  4.2
1965-1970  19.2  13.1  6.1
1970-1977  21.2  13.5  7.7
1978-1981  23.8  13.3  10.5
1982-1987  17.7  11.0  6.7
1988-1994  17.7  13.8  3.9
1995-1996  15.4  12.0  3.4
Source:  INEGI,  Sistema  de Cuentas  Nacionales,  Serie  1960-93
and  Serie  1988-96.  World  Bank,  "Mexico  After  the  Oil  Boom"
(Report  # 6659-ME),  1987,  for data in 1960-70.
The role of public investment under the new economic strategy is very
different from what it had been before.  To start, the decline in public investment is a
natural consequence of the privatization of many state enterprises. Also, the new strategy
sees the private sector as taking the lead in overall economic investment decisions and
limits the state to a facilitating role in providing public infrastructure that complements
private initiatives and to the correction of market failures.  The latter calls for a
refocusing of public investment in sectors considered to have important externalities
(education, health, environment) and whose services are traditionally under-provided by
the private sector.  To permit a better prioritization of the public investment program in
this sense, an "Investment Unit" was created in the Finance Secretariat in the early 1  990s
with broad review and clearance.
The change in strategy described above can be seen in Table 2 by noting
the decline of public investment in the two productive sectors, Agriculture and Industry,
Tourism & Commerce.  Public investment in both sectors used to account for around
20% of total public investment in the early 1980s and currently accounts for around 7%
of the total.  Also, the falling share of the communication and transport sectors after 1990,
reflects divestitures in the telecommunications sector. Conversely, the share of public
investment in the social sectors (education, health, social security, labor, nutrition and
social assistance, and urban and regional development) increased from less than 30
percent in the early 1980s to around 40 percent in the early 1990s. This share fell again
in the latter half of the 1  990s, but still remains significantly above the level in the 1  980s.
The sector that accounts for the greatest share of public investment is the energy sector,
which is dominated by the two parastatals, PEMEX and CFE. 5
5Table  2 does  not  include  public  sector  investments  at  the  state  and  municipal  levels,  which  represent
between 15 and 20 percent of total public investment.  INEGI breaks down total fixed investment into
Construction and Equipment & Machinery, each of which is again sub-divided into public and private5
The economic recession of 1995 placed further constraints on public
investment.  As the economy began to recover from the recession in 1996 and 1997,
public investment was expanded modestly in real terms (though not as a share of GDP).
This suggests that the government has been, by and large, sticking to its strategy of
relying mainly on private sector-led growth.  The only aspect that departs somewhat from
this strategy is the investment in the energy sector. Recognizing that this sector does not
share the "public good" attributes of the social sectors, the Government had announced in
1995 a program of progressive divestiture and increased private sector participation in the
"secondary" petrochemicals and electricity sub-sectors. Nevertheless, public investment
in the energy sector now occupies an even higher share of the public investment budget
than it did in the early 1  980s. As a share of GDP, however, it appears to have declined to
half the level in the early 1980s, but these figures are misleading because they do not
include the recently introduced "proyectos financiados".  6
Table 2: Sector Composition of Public Investment in Mexico
(as % of total public investment)
1982-1985  11.7  27.4  13.5  36.0  7.5  3.8
1986-1990  7.9  28.9  18.4  34.1  6.2  4.5
1991-1994  6.7  41.0  11.2  33.4  1.0  6.7
1995  5.1  36.8  12.0  40.3  0.9  4.9
1996  5.7  34.3  11.8  40.9  7.4
1997  6.6  33.6  9.6  44.4  5.9
1998B  7.2  35.0  9.4  42.7  5.6
Note: All figures refer to executed federal expenditures, except for 1998, which refers to budgeted.
Source: Presidencia de la Repuiblica,  "Inforne  de Gobierno, various issues, and "Proyecto
de Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federaci6n para el Ejercicio Fiscal, 1998.
In 1997, the Mexican Government introduced a new modality for public
investments, termed "proyectos financiados", which is based on "Build-Operate-
Transfer" or "Build-Lease-Transfer' principles.  These investments are not explicitly
included in the fiscal budget (although they do require Congressional authorization) and,
therefore, are not captured by the figures in Table 2.  "Proyectos financiados" consist of
investment.  Public investment in Construction is further subdivided into central government, social
security and para-statal enterprises (all of which are captured in the figures in Table 2) and local
government (comprising the state and municipal levels not captured in Table 2).  No such subdivision
is available for public investment in Equipment & Machinery, though it is conjectured that most
public investment under this rubric takes place in the parastatal enterprises.
6It  is important in this context to separate the issues of efficient spending versus sector management.
Arguably, the energy sector could benefit from greater private sector participation.  Being a
productive sector, however, sectoral investments should be guided primarily by rates of the return in
the sector, independent of whether it is the private or public sector that carries out the investment.
That is, if rates of return are adequate, sector investments should be insulated from public spending
cutbacks.6
long-term income-generating investment projects commissioned by the government, but
financed by the private sector, which is to be repaid from the proceeds from the operation
of the project.  It is not clear to what extent these projects represent a fiscal liability, even
though they do not involve immediate fiscal outlays.  Moreover, the "BLT" arrangements
also raise questions about the extent of private participation involved, other than in the
construction itself, and consequent implications for competition in the sector. The
amounts involved are significant: for 1997, the Mexican government had programmed 24
billion Pesos (equivalent to 24 % of the 1997 public investment budget) in "proyectos
financiados" in the hydrocarbons, electricity and highway sectors.  These projects are
expected to represent an increasing share of public investments devoted to income-
generating projects.
C. Public Investment and Economic Growth: Time Series Analysis
Crowding out or crowding in?  The discussion in Section A indicated that
the impact of public investment on economic growth can be positive or negative,
depending on the circumstances under which it is carried out.  The preceding overview
indicates that these underlying circumstances have varied significantly in Mexico over
the last four decades, so that its impact is likely to have varied accordingly over time.
Even so, Mexico's  experience in this regard is shown below to broadly mirror the
international experience described in Easterly et al (1994), which found that public
investment has tended, on balance, to exert a crowding out effect on private investment.
The equations in Table 3 describe the results from regressing private
investment (JP)  on the consolidated public sector expenditures (EG),  which are
decomposed into public investment (IG)  and government consumption expenditures (CG),
on consolidated public sector revenues (RG)  and GDP (Y), using simple least squares. 7
The regressions are based on annual data from 1970 to 1996 from the national income
accounts.  These series are non-stationary, so the regressions were carried out on the
differenced variables to avoid spurious correlation.  The equations in Table 3 were also
reestimated with Two-Stage-Least Squares, under the assumption that GDP was also an
dependent variable (not shown here).  This different procedure did not appreciably
change the results.
Three issues are of interest  in light of the earlier discussion: (a) whether
public investment crowds out or crowds in private investment, (b) whether that impact
occurs solely through its impact on the overall deficit (which leads to financial crowding
out), or whether public investment exerts an additional influence, and (c) whether there
has been any break in these relations after the Government embarked on its new
economic strategy in the mid-1980. The main findings from the regression with regard to
these issues are described next:
7These  equations  are  similar  to  the ones  estimated  by Rodriguez  (1994)  for  Argentina.7
Table 3: The Crowding  Out of Private  Investment  in Mexico
(1)  A[ I]  = -54.67  + 0.548AY + O.OOACG 0 - 0.455AIG  - 0.032 Ae
(13.06)* (0.084)*  (0.072)  (0.238)**  (0.099)
Unadjusted
R2 =  0.81,  D.W. = 0.92,  F-stat  =  21.79,  No. of obs. =  26
(2)  A[  1P]  = -66.71  + 0.628AY + 0.062ACG  - 0.573AIG  - 0.054 ARe
(22.17)*  (0.051)*  (0.059)  (0.162)*  (0.080)
Adjusted for autocorrelation
R  = 0.89,  D.W. =1.79,  F-stat=  30.51,  No. of obs. =  25,  AR(1) =0.69*
(3)  A[ IP) =  -50.42  +  0.487AY  -0.041ADEFG
(16.66)*  (0.043)*  (0.060)
Adjusted for autorcorrelation
R 2 = 0.82,  D.W.  =  1.99,  F-stat  =  32.15,  No. of  obs. =  25,  AR(1)  =  0.48*
(4)  A[ Ip] =  -101.45  + 0.697AY + 0.040ACG  - 0.627AIG - 0.016ARG + 47.0 DUM - 0.721DUM*AIG
(19.37)*  (0.065)*  (0.060)  (0.162)*  (0.080)  (23.93)**  (0.446)
Adjusted for autocorrelation
R'  =  0.92,  D.W. =  1.45,  F-stat  = 28.14,  No. of  obs. =  25,  AR(1)  =  0.53*
Notes.  These regressions are based on annual data from 1970-1996, obtained from the same source as
Table 1. The figures  in parentheses  denote  standard  errors. The asterisk  * (**) indicates  that the
coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 5% (10%) level.  A denotes differences.
*  Regression equations (1) and (2)  indicate that public investment has a negative and
significant impact on private investment, suggesting that it exerted a crowding out,
rather than crowding in effect in Mexico. Furthermore, the size of the crowding out
effect has been significant:  Regressions (1) and (4) indicate that private investment is
crowded out by a factor of around one-half of the change in public investment. 8
*  To examine whether the relation between private and public investment might be non-
linear, the change in public investment was added in quadratic form to the list of
explanatory variables in all the equations in Table 3, but the associated coefficients
were not significant.
8While  the regression  equations  in Table 3 gave  the best fit, it is necessary  to point  out that  the crowding-
out coefficient  is very sensitive  to the inclusion  or exclusion  of other  variables,  notably  GDP, among
the explanatory variables.  This suggests that there may be significant cyclical covariation in the
variables.8
*  The estimated coefficients on government consumption and revenues are of the
"wrong" sign, but they are not significant. This finding suggests that public
investment has a stronger crowding out effect on private investment than is accounted
for through its impact on the government deficit.  This finding is confirmed by a
(Wald) coefficient test, which rejects the hypothesis that c(2) =  c(3)  =  -c(4); where
c(i) refers to the ith coefficient on the right hand side of equation (1).  It is also
confirmed by regression (3), which imposes this parameter restriction.  Although the
sign of the coefficient on the government deficit is negative, as expected, its level of
significance is very low.
*  A Chow breakpoint test applied to the least restrictive regression equation (1)
indicates that the hypothesis of a structural break in 1986 cannot be rejected (at the
10% level).  Regression (4) reestimates regression equation (2) with a dummy
variable to capture changes in the coefficient on public investment after 1985.
Contrary to expectation, this yielded a negative sign for the coefficient on DUM*AIG,
indicating that the crowding out effect of public capital increased since 1985. But the
significance level of that coefficient is not high.  One possible reason for this lack of
significance is that the reform program was too recent to exert a noticeable impact in
the regressions.  For example, even though the public divestiture program began in
1983, the bulk of the privatizations took place after 1989.
The preceding estimation results suggest that on average public investment
has crowded out private investment in Mexico. 9 Although there remains considerable
uncertainty about the true size of the crowding out coefficient on public investment, it
turms  out to be less than unity in all the regressions, which means that the expansion of
public investment results in an expansion of total investment, even though not on a one-
for-one basis.  In other words, an expansion of public investment should still have a
positive effect on overall capital accumulation, which, in the absence of any productivity
decline, should lead to faster growth.  This last proviso is very important and will be
examined next.
Does public investment affect productivity growth?  Whether or not public
investment exerts an influence in addition to its net impact on factor accumulation, can be
tested by examining whether the economy's total factor productivity responds positively
or negatively to changes in the ratio of public to private investment.  As discussed in
Section A, such a response can be negative, if public capital is less productive or
procured more expensively than private capital, or positive, if public capital is
complementary to private capital.  The regressions in Table 4 are based on two alternative
9This  conclusion  conforms  with  the cross-country  findings  of Easterly  et al (1994),  who report (pg. 59)
that  "Consistent  with  the  theoretical  ambiguity  of  the relationship  between  public  capital  and  private
investnent,  the case studies found sharply different results. [...] It is seems reasonable to infer, then,
that for countries with a negative relationship (Chile, Colombia, Ghana and Mexico) or no
relationship  at all (Argentina),  public  investment  is concentrated  in activities  which substitute  directly
for private investment."9
measures of total factor productivity (TFPlow and TFPhigh).' 0 Initial diagnostic tests
pointed toward a first-order integrated process, so that all variables are expressed as
differences in the regressions.
The estimation results in Table 4 indicate that the ratio of public to private
investment is positively correlated with total factor productivity growth, and generally
significant, which suggests that public capital has exerted positive externalities for the
private capital that was not crowded out.  As before, the public-private investment ratio
was included in squared form among the explanatory variables to test for a possible non-
linearities in the relationship, but this yielded insignificant coefficients in all cases.
Table 4:  Public Investment and Total Factor Productivity in Mexico
(1.a) A(TFPhigh) =  -0.010  +  0.167 A(IG / IP)
(0.005)  (0.059)*
R  = 0.25,  D.W.  =  1.62,  F-stat = 7.93
(l.b)  A(TFPhigh)  - -0.008  - 0.004  DUM  +  0.167A(IG  / IP)  - 0.102DUM*  A(IG  /IP)
(0.005)  (0.010)  (0.056)*  (0.041)*
R2'=0.43,  D.W.  =1.51,  F-stat=5.19
(2.a)  A(TFPlow) =  -0.009  +  0.134 A(IG/I)
(0.004)  (0.052)*
R2 =0.21,  D.W. =1.71,  F-stat = 6.54
(2.b) A(TFP1ow)  =  -0.007  - 0.003 DUM  +  0.137A(IG  /  IP)  - 0.092DUM*  A(IG  / lP)
(0.005)  (0.009)  (0.050)*  (0.037)*
R 2 = 0.40,  D.W. = 1.51,  F-stat = 4.66
Source: Same as Table 3 and Bosworth (1997).  Each regression is based on 26 observations referring to annual
data from  1970 to 1995. Terms in parentheses are standard errors. Asterisks indicate significance at 5%.
Finally, Chow tests pointed to a significant break in the mid- 1  980s.  In
contrast to the earlier results, this time the coefficients associated with the Dummy
variables indicate a significant change in the relation between productivity and the public-
private investment ratio.  In particular, the results indicate that the positive relationship
between both variables appears to have weakened after 1985. This comes as a surprise
again: as discussed earlier, the existence of a positive relationship between both variables
can be interpreted to imply a certain complementarity between public and private
0 Both measures of total factor productivity are aggregative concepts derived in the standard manner as a
residual after netting out the contribution of factor accumulation.  To derive these residuals, output is
measured by GDP, labor input is measured by the economically active labor force, and the physical
capital stock is constructed using a perpetual inventory method with two alternative depreciation
rates; 6% (low) and 12% (high).10
investment. The refocusing of public investment priorities in line with the government's
new economic strategy after 1985 was intended to increase the complementarity between
public and private investment.  It is surprising, then, that this relationship should have
weakened. Again, a possible answer is that the reforms are still too recent to have exerted
a noticeable impact. Alternatively, this result may be reflecting an interaction with
omitted variables that are exerting a downward influence of total factor productivity
growth in the early 1990s.1'
The finding that public investment generally has been positively related to
TFP suggests that the considerations about the potential mismeasurement and relative
inefficiency of public capital do not, on average, appear to have been empirically
significant in Mexico.  Some circumstantial  evidence that supports this finding is a
reasonably close correspondence between the perpetual inventory-based monetary
measures of the capital stock produced by the Banco de Mexico for the electricity,
transport and communications sectors and physical measures of public capital capacity in
these sectors (e.g., kilowatt hours of electricity production). 12 In each case the monetary
measures capture the substantial growth in physical capital which occurred from 1970 to
1990 (or, in the case of telecommunications, from 1975 to 1990). Taking into
consideration that the monetary measures of public investment spending include
expenditures on capital items that are not directly represented by the particular physical
measures (e.g., transportation capital includes more than the number of kilometers of
roads and rail), we can conclude that the monetary measures are acceptable proxies for
the true public capital stock in the case of Mexico.
D. Public Capital and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Perspective
A large body of empirical research has investigated the static impact of
changes in the stock of public capital on economic performance; Aschauer, 1997. The
main focus of that research has been to determine the importance of public infrastructure
on the private sector's productive capacity, to its costs of production and/or to its level of
profitability.  By and large, this research concludes that public capital exerts an important
positive influence on the performance of the private sector economy.  But these findings -
- which are static in nature -- have left open the question of the dynamic, or long run,
effects of public capital on the economy." 3 More recent attempts to capture the dynamic
1 The existence  of such influences  is discussed  in the 1998  World  Bank's Country  Economic
Memorandum  on Mexico:  Enhancing  Factor  Productivity  Growth. It draws attention  to the failure  of
Mexico's  productivity  growth  to recover  as quickly  as in other countries  after inflation  was stabilized
and structural  economic  reforms  had been implemented.
A note of caution  is in order here: The disaggregated  capital  stock series  used for this comparison  are
based on an earlier constant  price series,  with  base-1970,  produced  by the Banco  de Mexico. These
series  were recently  re-based  (to base  year 1980),  which  resulted  in significant  revisions  in some
individual  series (notably  Communications),  while the series  for the Electricity  sector  was
discontinued.
13 The few empirical  studies  that have focused  on the Mexican  economy  (e.g., Shah, 1992,  Feltenstein  and
Ha, 1995,  and Nazmi and  Ramirez, 1997)  are of this type. They  investigate  the relationship  between11
effects  of public capital  on economic  growth  have identified  a positive empirical  link in
this context. These have  mostly  relied on data from the Unites States  and other
developed  countries,  however,  which limits  their suitability  for estimating  the impact  of
changes  in Mexico's public capital  stock  on output growth. The analysis  below,
therefore,  estimates  a growth  equation based on data for 46 developing  countries  with
similar levels of output  per capita as Mexico.
Theory
The growth  equation  below is derived  from the (Robert)  Solow-inspired
analytical  framework  elaborated  by Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil (1992)  and Hulten  (1996).
That framework  departs  from a simple  neoclassical  production  function,  written  here for
simplicity  in a Cobb-Douglas  specification  with labor-augmenting  technical  progress:
(1)  Y  =  F(K,  EK,  H,  L)  =  (K" )aP(EKG)aG(H)aI(AL)(-  ap-  aG-  aH)
where,  Y denotes  aggregate  output,  K" and KG  denote  the private and public  capital
stocks,  H stands  for human  capital,  L is the stock of labor,  A denotes  the level of total
factor productivity  and E is an index of the efficiency  of use of public  capital. Dividing
both sides of the equation  by AL and taking natural  logs yields,
(2)  y =  f(k",  k,  e, h)  = a, +  ap  k  + aGk  + aE  e +  aHh,
where  all variables  except 'e' are now expressed  in terms of  "effective"  units of labor.
The evolution  of the capital  stocks  is assumed  to obey the following
sirnple  formulation:
(3)  d(KZ/AL)/dt  =  szY/AL  - (KZI/AL)  for z = P, K, H.
where sz represents  the savings  (and investment)  rate associated  with the capital  stock z,
and X  represents  the effective  rate of depreciation,  equal to the sum  of the rates of
population  growth (n), technological  progress  (g) and of the physical  depreciation  of
capital  (s).  The economy  modeled  by this framework  has the characteristic  of converging
to a steady state solution,  given  by the point where, d(KZ/AL)/dt  = 0 for all z. From (3),
this yields that the steady state value of capital  is KZ/Y  = sz/I2,  which,  when expressed  in
natural  logs, yields kZ* =  ln(sz/k), where  the asterisks  denote  steady state values.
Along  the transition  path from an arbitrarily  given starting  point, y(O),  the
level of output is governed  by the following  equation:
(4)  y(t) = (1  - e)y*  + el"y(O),
public  investment  and  private  sector  performance,  rather  than the impact  on overall  growth and
productivity12
where p. turns out to be equal to X(1- ap-  aG - a.).  Inserting the steady state solution
emerging from this framework into the above equation leads to the following growth
expression corresponding to the earlier output function (2):
(5)  y(T)  - y(O)  =  b. + byy(O)  +  bpln(sp/X)  + bG  ln(sG/X)  + bEe + bHln(sH/X),
where (s%/X),  for z = P, G, and H, can be taken from equation (3) to represent the steady-
state levels of private, public and human capital, expressed as shares of GDP.  Those
capital stocks are not directly observable, whereas this equation is expressed entirely in
terms of measurable variables -- real GDP per capita, investment rates for different
capital stocks, the "effective" depreciation rate and an efficiency index, to be defined
later.  The variables y(T) and y(O)  represent the (log) level of output per capita in the
terminal year and in the initial year chosen for the empirical analysis.  The difference,
therefore, denotes the rate of growth of output per capita over the entire period, T.  Since
the growth expression (5) is derived from the production function (2), the growth
elasticities (i.e., the b's in (5)) are related to the output elasticities (the a's in 2) according
to the following formula: az =  bz /( bp +  bG + bH- by), for z =  P, G, H.
According to this model, output grows in the steady state at the same rate
as population growth plus the rate of technological change.  A permanent change in the
per-capita level of one of the capital stocks changes the steady state level of the output
per capita.  In the new steady state, output per capita grows at the same rates as in the old
steady state.  However, during the transition, from one steady state to the other, the
growth rate is different.  The growth impact discussed below refers to this transitional
change of growth, which depends on two factors: the distance between the old steady
state equilibrium and the new one (which in turn depends on how much the steady state
capital stock is changed) and on the rate of convergence (i.e., the rate at which the
economy moves from one to the other steady state equilibrium), which is determined by
the coefficient on initial output per capita, by.
The Estimated Equation
The basic growth equation that is estimated below is given by equation
(5), which has been augmented by two additional variables:
y(T)  - y(O)  =  b. + byy(O)  +  bpln(sp/X)  + bG  ln(sG/X) + bHln(sH/X),
+  bEe  +  bD(DEBT/Y)  +  bc(ln(CG  /Y)),
where y(.) represents the natural log of GDP per capita, the sz's represent investment
ratios associated with each capital stock, X refers to the "effective" depreciaton rate, 'e'is
an index of efficiency of public capital use,  DEBT/Y is the ratio of foreign debt to GDP,
and C0/Y is the ratio of public consumption expenditure to GDP.  As discussed before,
the first set of variables on the right hand side of the growth equation are proxies referring13
to the three types capital stocks that are assumed to influence growth. The second set of
variables on the right hand side of the equation are included in the regressions to capture
the impact of differences in efficiency of public capital utilization and in the financing of
public capital, as explained in more detail below.
The parameters of the growth equation are estimated with data for 46
developing countries over the period 1970-1990, from the data set in Easterly and Rebelo
(1993) and various issues of the World Bank's World Development Report.14
(Accordingly, note that since y(.) is expressed in natural logs, y(T) - y(0)  represents a
growth rate over a 20-year time interval, T.)  Private and public investment rates
(expressed as shares of output) were averaged for each country over the period 1970-1990
and then deflated by the average effective depreciation rate over that period to generate
proxies for the private and public capital stocks.  It is pertinent to note that public capital
as defined here does not correspond directly to the definition of infrastructure capital. In
most countries, the bulk of transportation, power and other public infrastructure facilities
are publicly owned, but in several countries, some of these facilities are partly privately
owned.  Human capital is proxied by secondary education enrollment rates averaged over
the same 20-year period.
Hulten (1996) drew attention to the importance of taking into account the
efficiency with which the public capital stock is being used, along with the absolute
amount of that stock.  To capture this effect, a continuous measure of public capital
efficiency across countries has been constructed on the basis of the four indicators used in
Hulten (1996) and obtained from the 1995 World Development Report.  The four
indicators are (i) mainline faults per 100 telephone calls for telecommunications, (ii)
electricity generation losses as a percent of total electricity output, and (iii) the percentage
of paved roads in good condition and (iv) diesel locomotive utilization as a percentage of
the total rolling stock.  Each of these indicators was normalized so that performance in a
particular category is measured in terms of standard deviations from the cross-country
average level of performance.  Then a simple average across performance indicators was
taken to obtain an aggregate index for each country." 5
As discussed at the beginning, the impact of public capital on economic
growth is likely to vary according to how it is financed.  There are two basic options
considered in the growth equation estimated below.  One is debt finance, which implies a
higher level of taxes (and its distorting consequences).  The other option is the
reorientation of public expenditures from government consumption to investment
spending, which would maintain the level of debt and taxation constant.  Following Barro
'4The 46 developing  countries  used in these  regressions  coincide  with  the same  sub-set  of countries  used in
Hulten's (1966) analysis.
15It is interesting  to note that Mexico  ranked  second  highest  among  the 46 develbping  countries  in terms of
the public  capital  efficiency  index. (Mauritius  ranked  the highest  and  Nigeria  ranlked  last.) The
parameters  underlying  Mexico's efficiency  index are (a) 13%  of electric  power  generation  output  is
lost,  (b) 85% of paved roads are in good  condition,  and (c) 64% of diesel  inventory  is in use.14
(1990),  the impact  of financing  is incorporated  into the estimation  equations  through  two
additional  variables:  the external  public debt," 6 expressed  as the (absolute)  ratio of total
output,  and the (natural  log) ratio of public  consumption  expenditures  to total output.
Table 5 provides  the sample  average  and Mexico-specific  values  of some  key variables.
Table  5:
Average  values for 46 developing  countries  and Mexico
(s0 I  )/  (sPl)  (CG/  DEBT/Y  X  |
Sample  average  1.08  1.35  0.18  0.30  0.076
Mexico  1.07  1.73  0.08  0.21  0.075
Note:  these  averages  pertain  to the  period  1970-1990.
Estimation  Results
The first set of four equations  in Table 6 presents  the basic estimates  of the
growth  equation,  using only the various  capital  stocks  as explanatory  variables. The main
result  here is that the direct  impact  of a change in the public capital  stock  is almost
identical  to that of a change  in the private  capital stock;  and both are significant. Another
noteworthy  result, of interest  more from a technical  perspective,  is that the assumption  of
constant  returns  to scale is not rejected  by the data. (Under  constant  returns  to scale the
coefficient  on the effective  depreciation  rate should  be 0). This last result carries  through
in all subsequent  equation  specifications.
The second  set of equations,  (5) - (8), shows  the effect of incorporating  all
the other  variables  as well into the growth  equation. In all cases,  the efficiency  index has
a positive and highly significant  impact. Both financing  variables  are also statistically
significant  (most  of the time)  and have  the expected  negative  sign. That is, higher  public
debt levels are associated  with lower  rates of growth,  as are higher  levels of government
consumption.  Another  consequence  of introducing  both variables  is that the growth
elasticity  of public capital  regains  it statistical  significance,  albeit the size of the impact  is
somewhat  smaller  than before.
A number  of tentative  conclusions  can be drawn  with respect  to the
relationship  between  public  capital  and economic  growth  on the basis of equation  (7) in
Table 6, which yields  the best fit for the entire  cross-country  sample. 17 [In the
comparative  statics  exercises  described  next, it is convenient  to remember  -- from
equation  3 earlier -- that the investment  ratios in Table  6 may be interpreted  as the natural
log of the steady-state  capital-output  ratios;  i.e., (sz/X)  = exp(kz)  =  (KZ  /Y)*.]
1lt  would  have been preferable  to use total (i.e.,  internal  and external)  public  debt as a measure  of the
burden  of financing  public  capital,  but comparable  data on internal  debt is not available  for many
countries.
17As usual,  in drawing  such conclusions  from cross-country  data it is implicitly  assumed  that all countries
share  the same  structural  parameters  (i.e.,  the production  function  elasticities),  and only vary  with
regard to the behavioral  parameters.15
Table 6:  Public Capital and Economic Growth
(Dependent  Variable  =  y(90) -y(70); Standard  Errors  in parentheses)
Regression  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
independent variables  ___  _
Constant  0.88  1.20  1.42  1.53  1.29  1.54  1.63  1.89
(0.57)  (1.42)  (0.56)  (1.41)  (0.43)  (1.07)  (0.42)  (1.04)
y(70)  -0.38  -0.38  -0.36  -0.36  -0.41  -0.41  -0.39  -0.39
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)
total  capital  (ln((sr+sG)/X))  0.67  0.68  ---  ---  0.39  0.39
(0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)
private  capital  (ln(sX/X))  - 0.31  0.31  --  ---  0.20  0.20
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.08)
public  capital (ln(sJX))  ---  0.30  0.30  ---  ---  0.22  0.29
(0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)
Human  capital  (In(sA/X))  0.27  0.28  0.25  0.25  0.20  0.21  0.18  0.19
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)
Efficiency (e)  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.28  0.28  0.26  0.26
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)
debt  ratio  (DEBTIY)  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.28  -0.29  -0.41  -0.42
(0.18)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.19)
public consumption (ln(CG/Y))  ---  ---  -0.33  -0.31  -0.29  -0.29
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)
effective  depreciation  (ln(X))  ---  0.13  ---  0.04  - 0.10  0.10
(0.24)  (0.53)  (0.41)  (0.39)
adj. RA2  0.43  0.42  0.45  0.44  0.69  0.68  0.71  0.71
Standard Error (SER)  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.23  0.24  0.22  0.22
Aschauer  (1997)
*  Debt-financed public capital increase -- increases in the public capital stock, financed
entirely through the issuing of debt would lead to lower growth.  This result is derived
by taking the following derivatives of the estimated growth equation under the
condition that d(KG  /Y)* = d(DEBT/Y) and inserting the Mexico-specific parameters
from Table  6: 18
18  The following  expression  states  that a 10  percent increase  in the steady-state  ratio of public  capital  to
GDP (i.e, d(ln((K 0 /Y)*) = dln(s/X) = 0.10)  reduces  the (20-year)  growth  rate  by -2.0*(sJIX).  Using
the Mexico-specific  parameters  in Table  A4.  1, which  refer  to averages  over 1970-90,  the public
investment  ratio was around  8 percent - fiDP.  This yields  a decline  in the 20-year  growth  rate by
-2.14 percent. Translated  into an annua, growth  rate, this represents  a decline  of roughly  0.1  % per
year. Currently,  the investment  ratio is only around  3.5 percent. Hence,  a 10  percent increase  in the16
d(y(T) -y(0))  =  1 G_  - bD  =  0.22  - 0.41  =  -0.20
d(sG/X))  (KG  Iy)*  1.07
*  Consumption-financed public capital increase -- increases in the public capital stock,
financed through the reduction in government consumption expenditures (thereby
leaving the budget deficit intact) would lead to higher growth.  To obtain this results,
take the following derivative under the condition that d(KG  /Y)*) = - d(exp(CG  /Y)):19
d(y(T) -y(O))  =  bG_  -__c_  =  0.22  +  0.29  =  3.83
d(sG/X))  (KG/Y)*  (CG/Y)  1.07  0.08
*  Crowding-out effects -- the preceding two results do not take into account the
possibility of crowding out of private capital.  The earlier time series estimates
suggested that increases in public investment crowded out private investment by a
factor of around 0.50. The full impact of a change in public capital can be estimated
by imposing the further condition that  d(KG  /Y)*) = -0.5 d(K' /Y)*), in the preceding
derivations.  That results in the subtraction of the term  [0.5]bp/(sp/X)  =
[0.5][0.20]/1.73  =  0.058  from the previous two results.  In other words, the
estimated impact of a debt-financed increase in public investment would be to reduce
growth by a factor of -0.26, while a government consumption-financed increase
would raise growth by a factor of +3.77.
The main conclusion suggested by the preceding derivations is that public
investment would only have a clear positive impact on growth in Mexico if it is financed
by equal reductions in government consumption expenditures.  In that case, Mexico
hardly has any leeway for stimulating growth in this manner because its level of current
expenditures is already at rock bottom levels.  As described in Figure 1, total public
expenditures have declined significantly since the mid-1980s.  While most of that decline
took place in non-discretionary interest expenditures, programmable consumption
spending also experienced a significant contraction and it is now among the lowest in the
world as a share of GDP.  Further cuts will be extremely difficult to achieve, especially in
view of many new fiscal commitments that have emerged in the wake of the pension
reform and banking support programs, and that may emerge in the future in response to
pressures arising from the pattern of increased earnings inequality that has developed
over the last decade.
steady-state  public  capital  ratio,  which implies  raising  the public  investment  ratio 0.35 % of GDP,
would  cause  a 20-year  growth  rate decline  of only  0.93 percent,  or less  than 0.05 percent  per year.
19Using the same  reasoning  as in the preceding  footnote,  a 10 percent  increase  in the steady-state  public
capital  ratio financed  through correspondingly  lower  government  consumption,  would  raise  the 20-
year growth  rate by 41 percent,  under the old parameter  ratios, and by 17.9 percent  under  the current
public  investment  ratios. These respectively  translate  into annual  growth  rates of 2% and 0.9%.17
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Fortunately, the constraints facing Mexico in this regard are not quite as
paralyzing as they may seem at first sight.  For a start, it has to be kept in mind that the
preceding parameter estimates reflect average behavioral relationships across countries
and as they pertained over a particular period in time.  To the extent that Mexico can
improve the quality of its public investments, both relative to the cross-country average
and relative to its own past performance, there is hope that its public investment program
could make a stronger contribution to growth.  In this context, an improvement in quality
means paying closer attention to the choice of public investments so that it complements
private economic activity (thereby resulting in less crowding out and more crowding in of
private investment) and results in a more efficient use of public capital (thereby raising its
rate of return).  Stated differently, if public investments are carried out in the same
manner as before, then its impact on growth is anticipated to remain very limited.  Only
by improving the process of identifying and preparing investment projects, with more
attention to social rates of return, can a more significant growth impact be achieved.
F.  Concluding Summary
The preceding analysis provides limited support to the claim that the
decline in public investment since the 1  970s contributed in some measure to the decline
in Mexico's total factor productivity growth. However, it also suggests that increases in
public investment will not automatically translate into faster output and productivity
growth. One reason why a positive relationship between more public investment and
faster growth cannot be taken for granted is the high crowding out effect that appears to
have characterized public investments in the past.  Another is that the positive
relationship between public investment and productivity growth appears to have18
weakened in the 1990s.  Finally, the scope for generating faster growth by correcting
past resource misallocations -- through reductions in "wasteful" public consumption in
favor of higher public investment -- also has become much more limited.  Therefore, the
only way to assure that the public investment program makes a significant contribution to
growth is by improving the quality of public investment through careful attention to its
rate of return and complementarity to private capital.
The most important reform in terms of raising the quality and productivity
of public investment followed from the Government's recognition of the need for a
clearer distinction between the roles of the public and private sectors.  This resulted in the
privatization of most parastatal enterprises and a reorientation of public investment
toward a more narrowly focused set of activities.  The Government also recognized the
need to strengthen the institutional framework within which the public investment
program is determined.  Accordingly, an Investment Unit was created in the Finance
Secretariat (SHCP) in 1992 to be in charge of evaluating and prioritizing public
investment expenditures. 20 In 1995, this Unit was merged with a parallel unit that had
been in charge of the divestiture and privatization program.  Under the current system,
each public executing agency is required to prioritize its program of proposed
investments, including rates of return analyses, prior to its submission to Congress as part
of the fiscal budget.  This represents an important improvement in terms of
institutionalizing the notions of prioritizing and of giving attention to economic returns
when defining the public investment program. Also, the merger of the former Divestiture
Unit with the current Investment Unit represented an important step in terms of creating
greater consciousness within the Investment Unit about the need to distinguish between
the role of the public and private sectors.  Both steps are expected to yield projects with
higher returns and should help reduce the degree of crowding out of private investment in
the future.
May 1998
20 This Unit, officially  named  "Unidad  de Inversiones  y de Desincorporaciones  de Entidades
Paraestatales",  was created  as part of an institutional  reorganization  that fused  the former  Budget  and
Programming  Secretariat  with  the Finance  Secretariat.19
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